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Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships. They breach the 
attachments of  family, friendship, love, and community. They shatter the construction of  
the self  that is formed and sustained in relation to others. They undermine the belief  sys-
tems that give meaning to human experience. They violate the victim’s faith in a natural or 
divine order and cast the victim into a state of  existential crisis. 
Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery 
 
 
It is thanks largely to Giorgio Agamben’s work on the “state of  exception” that questions of  state sov-
ereignty and state violence, of  who is protected and who is excluded, and of  the margins and failings 
of  law in times of  emergency have dominated certain strands of  political philosophy in the post-9/11 
world. The decision on the “exception”—originally theorized by Carl Schmitt as the emblematic 
mark of  sovereignty—has, on Agamben’s account, increasingly come to inform the organizational 
core (and the political reality) of  sovereign and state power, and has gone from proving the rule to 
establishing the rule. The decision, in other words, has become “a technique of  government rather than 
an exceptional measure,” and as such the normalized logic of  modern governmentality (Agamben 
2005, 6–7, emphasis added). And if  modernity is marked by the normalization of  the logic of  the 
exception, then it is also marked by the normalization of  “unlimited authority” and the monopoly of  
sovereign violence (Schmitt 1985, 12). Unique to the sovereign decision of  today is that “it radically 
erases any legal status of  the individual, thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable be-
ing” (Agamben 2005, 3). However, insofar as “[t]he state of  exception thus ceases to be referred to as an external 
and provisional state of  factual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself,” there are increasingly 
entire populations of  subjects who have, for the sake of  the purity of  the state, become excluded from 
political protection and thereby acutely vulnerable to state violence (Agamben 1998, 168).
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     Influential though this reading has been, the conceptual framework of  the “exception” cru-
cially fails to account for the way in which such violence is felt under conditions of  normalized, 
extralegal sovereign power. In other words, it is precisely when we accept that modernity is 
characterized by the state of  exception turned rule without interrogating the actual operation of  
the normalized “decision” that we are unable, in the words of  Judith Butler (2004), to account 
for the ways in which power “functions differentially, to target and manage certain populations, 
to derealize the humanity of  subjects who might potentially belong to a community bound 
by commonly recognized laws” (68). This article accordingly problematizes the “exception” 
framework for precluding an analysis of  the very experience of  sovereign violence, due to its 
identification of  the sovereign “decision” as a fundamentally ontologizing force that problemat-
ically renders bare life “a condition to which we are all reducible” (67, emphasis added). The 
approach I put forward here is predicated on a new understanding of  sovereign power based 
not on a “decision” which renders all subjects “bare,” but rather on the exercise of  arbitrary 
violence to which different subject-populations are vulnerable to varying degrees. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, such a critical phenomenological articulation of  sovereign violence can 
attend to the existential phenomenological consequences once the structures that make possible 
its exercise are dismantled or overcome.1  To this end, I conclude with a meditation on the trau-
matization resulting from persistent and pervasive anxiety by turning to narratives of  subjects 
living in spaces where arbitrary sovereign violence is particularly acute.  
     Importantly, I do not suggest that we altogether abandon the conceptual framework of  the ex-
ception; indeed, there is much in the theory of  the exception that is valuable to my analysis and 
upon which I draw at various points in this article. My critique is therefore one of  sufficiency: if  
we aim to theorize modern political violence and exclusion—and more importantly, if  we aim 
to bring to light the experiences of  the most marginalized, most liminal, and most precarious—it 
is not enough simply to articulate the grid of  intelligibility of  how sovereign violence is realized 
in institutions and norms, not enough to identify where exclusion takes place and how subjects 
are rendered in these places, not enough to simply state that “we are all virtually homines sacri” 
(Agamben 1998, 115). Instead, we must rethink contemporary political space as a horizon com-
prised of  modalities which contour the lived experiences and conditions of  possibilities of  var-
ious subjects therein, rather than as demarcated, exceptional or extralegal regions which ontolo-
gize subjects into generalized categories of  “bare life.” By thus looking at both the mechanisms 
that make possible arbitrary sovereign violence as well as survivor accounts of  those who have 
experienced such violence firsthand, I propose a new understanding of  modern subjecthood 
as one of existential insecurity as a result of pervasive anxiety under conditions of arbitrary sovereign violence. 
     1 “Critical phenomenology,” as I understand it, is the utilization of  the classical phenomenological emphasis on 
lived experience in tandem with an emphasis on the interpersonal nature of  lived experience and the rearticu-
lation of  the “subject” as not only constituting of  the world, but also constituted by the world. It is only such an 
interpersonal and mutually constituting nature of  subjectivity that can account for, as thinkers like Frantz Fanon 
have shown us, the ways in which intersubjective and politicized contexts contour the conditions of  possibility 
open to differently-constituted bodies. The hope, in so doing, is the possibility of  making visible discrete sites of  
power and, as such, spaces for intervention in social and political struggles. As put beautifully by Gayle Salamon 
(2018), “if  phenomenology offers us unparalleled means to describe what we see with utmost precision, to illu-
minate what is true, critique insists that we also attend to the power that is always conditioning that truth” (15).
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I.  
FROM SOVEREIGN DECISION TO ARBITRARY VIOLENCE 
Much of  why Giorgio Agamben identifies the state of  exception as nomos of  modern poli-
tics is the emphasis on security in a state-centric global order that upholds state sovereignty as 
the highest political virtue. Arguably, the security paradigm has intensified immensely in the 
post-9/11 Western (and especially U.S.) world through the framing of  terrorism as the biggest 
threat to secular, democratic life. In the undefined and ongoing “War on Terror,” the U.S. has 
propagated the existence of  a perpetual threat (against its territorial integrity, against its hege-
monic imperialist aims, and against its dominance as a world power) as justification for taking 
exceptional securitization measures both inside the state (through heightened surveillance, vet-
ting of  “suspicious” persons, and racial profiling) and beyond (paradigmatically through drone 
warfare). Unique to the security paradigm is that, once threat has been woven into the fabric 
of  political life as such, then the state need not identify a clear object of  threat—the hallmark of  
Schmitt’s sovereign decision—and instead is able to take any exceptional measure, at any time, 
in the name of  self-preservation. A consequence of  this new sovereign logic is a shift away from 
the sovereign decision toward the arbitrary exercise of  sovereign violence.
     What distinguishes “arbitrary” violence from violence simpliciter is that the violence is often 
unanticipated, unforeseeable, or unknowable in advance by those upon whom the violence is 
ultimately inflicted. My understanding of  “arbitrary” here draws from Robert Barsky’s (2016) 
characterization of  “arbitrariness in law” (which itself  is, he acknowledges, contextually and 
contingently indexed) as a counterpoint to legal discretion. Discretionary decision-making—char-
acterized principally as some sort of  reasoned evaluation—“has to be undertaken in a reasonable 
manner, consistent with the statutory powers of  the agency in question” (20, emphasis added). 
Conversely, “arbitrariness” contains within it an element of  unreasonableness, a characterization 
that falls in line with Timothy Endicott’s (2014) description (also cited by Barsky) of  arbitrary 
government as “a distinctive form of  unreasonable government; it is a departure from the rule of  
law, in favor of  rule by the mere will of  the rulers” (49, emphasis added). What Endicott empha-
sizes is the lack of  justification as a marker of  this unreasonableness and, thus, of  arbitrariness: “a 
decision is arbitrary,” Endicott writes, “whenever the law itself  ought to demand a justification 
other than the fact that the decision maker made it, and there is no such justification” (70). 
     Widely accepted by legal theorists such as Barsky and Endicott, “reasonable” justification 
may include reliance on past precedent, compliance with procedure, or grounding in reasoned 
discretion. However, as George Wright (2010) explains in the context of  law, “a decision is often 
thought of  as arbitrary when it is ‘founded on prejudice and preference rather than on reason 
or fact,’” the former of  which are often mired in systemic and ideological biases (847). Arbi-
trary political decision-making may thus include political decisions or policies that are motivat-
ed by the biases and whims of  the relevant party, without appeal to past precedent, procedural 
norms, or reasonable evidence.2  Taking undocumented immigrants as the emblematic modern 
figure upon whom arbitrary law is applied, Barsky (2016) observes that their preemptive “un-
documented” status allows law enforcement officials to stop, detain, or charge them by singling 
out individuals who bear the “mark” of  the stereotyped “illegal alien,” “by their skin color, 
their accent, their inability to speak the language of  the host country or by their license or ID 
(or lack thereof)” (2). The strength of  executive power under these circumstances is heightened 
when subjects are rendered “illegal” or, as Agamben (2005) states in the case of  Guantánamo 
     2 Barsky (2016) himself  lists racism and xenophobia as possible dimensions of  such biases (18).
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detainees, “legally unnameable and unclassifiable” (3). 
     Barsky’s and Wright’s recognition of  the deeply prejudiced nature of  arbitrariness is sig-
nificant, speaking as it does to the reality that not all subjects are equally vulnerable to arbitrary sov-
ereign power. Indeed, one of  the biggest challenges to Agamben’s theory of  homo sacer is the 
perceived ahistorical and apolitical framing of  victims of  sovereign violence embedded with-
in. Given Agamben’s use of  the Nazi camp as the emblematic site where bare life is pro-
duced (though he does, in a later work, recognize Guantánamo Bay as the “modern” camp), 
many postcolonial and critical race theorists have criticized Agamben’s lack of  historical and 
material contextualization of  homo sacer.3  As Shampa Biswas and Sheila Nair (2010) note: 
[e]ven if  one accepts Agamben’s argument that the camp may be the nomos of  
our present, the distribution of  bodily vulnerability in that present is far from 
democratic and indeed remains profoundly asymmetrical. Understanding 
which bodies are at risk of  exceptionalization through the logic of  sovereignty 
requires us to be attentive to the workings of  colonial power. (6)
 
Sensitive, too, to the racial politics driving immigration law in the United States and elsewhere, 
Barsky and Wright recognize that a constellation of  sovereign practices—from executive or-
ders to immigration and incarceration policies—as well as social discourses—regarding who 
“belongs” and who threatens the imagined or desired hegemony of  the nation-state—today 
have left a host of  racialized subjects at the mercy of  arbitrary violence without any clear un-
derstanding of  when (during daytime police checkpoints or nighttime raids), upon which subjects 
(which migrant communities, which subjects of  color failing to comply by hegemonic standards 
of  civility), and by whom (police, security personnel, TSA agents) sovereign power will be en-
forced.
     Nevertheless, Barsky’s and Wright’s analyses of  arbitrary law fall very much in line with Gi-
orgio Agamben’s (2005) reformulation of  the space of  exception as an “anomic space in which 
what is at stake is a force of  law without law” (39). In traditional law, according to Agamben, 
“reference to the concrete case entails a ‘trial’ that always involves […] an enunciation whose 
operative reference to reality is guaranteed by the institutional powers” (39–40, emphasis added). 
What Agamben touches upon here is the necessity of  discretion (as that which justifies the 
norm’s application to a concrete particular) as a norm of  the juridical sphere. This of  course 
is a feature of  law that even Aristotle foresaw, recognizing that the articulation of  law—gen-
eralized principles—could never account for all possible cases, and the elevation of  virtuous 
phronesis as critical for just legislation: “in the case of  law,” Agamben too writes, “the application 
of  a norm is in no way contained within the norm and cannot be derived from it,” and this is precisely 
why trial and due process become critical conduits for establishing justified application (40, 
emphasis added). It is in the state of  exception where the justificatory link between law and its 
target of  application becomes “impossible,” the “threshold at which logic and praxis blur with 
each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference” (40, 
     3 Postcolonial and critical race-oriented critiques of  homo sacer were, in the immediate aftermath of  Homo Sacer’s 
publication, widely circulated. One of  the predominant criticisms launched against this figure was the de-con-
textualization of  homo sacer from her historico-material context into a generalizable referent of  victimhood and 
oppression. I myself  have offered a critique along these veins (see Ahmed 2019), but recognize that an array of  
alternative readings of  Agamben’s “ontology” have emerged that aim to partially vindicate homo sacer from such 
critiques. Here, the work of  Mathew Abbott (2014) is both indispensable and deeply persuasive, wherein Abbott 
suggests that “such criticisms depend in large part upon a category mistake” which fails to look at Agamben’s 
ontology as deeply enmeshed with politics rather than an abstraction away therefrom (17).
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emphasis added). Just as in arbitrary law there is an unjustifiable departure from the rule of  law, 
so too in the state of  exception does the sovereign transcend the law in response to a supposed 
threat to the security of  the State that law cannot foresee, abandoning logos in its wake. 
     If  we take arbitrary sovereign violence as the defining characteristic of  the normalized state of  
exception, then the prevailing consequence for vulnerable populations is a feeling of  “fear and 
uncertainty” borne from not knowing when one will be targeted, precisely because there is “no rule of  
law upon which to rely” in terms of  profiling potential “threats” (Barsky 2016, 150). Accordingly, 
members of  such vulnerable populations live in a near-constant state of  what some have called 
“ontological insecurity” and which I call existential insecurity generated by persistent anxiety.4 
Once the status (whether in terms of  legality or criminality) of  entire populations hinges on the 
whims of  executive forces, the ever-present possibility of  being singled out leaves one tempo-
rally and spatially bereft of  security. For these persons, “the object of  danger or fear is either 
absent/non-identifiable, or in such a proximity that no reassurance can be offered” (Eklundh, 
Zevnik, and Guittet 2017, 5) and “[t]he perception of  time and space becomes displaced by the 
modes in which anxiety operates and changes the socio-political landscape” (7). 
     In order to better assess how precisely anxiety takes shape “on the ground,” so to speak, I 
turn now to a phenomenological rearticulation of  the “state of  exception” in order to high-
light the existential consequences generated by arbitrary sovereign violence. It is the experi-
ences of  those who inhabit spaces of  exception—in other words, those who are particularly 
vulnerable to arbitrary sovereign violence—that demand attention, and where the concep-
tual framework of  the “state of  exception” alone is insufficient. Importantly, my use of  trau-
ma studies here is not intended to diagnose vulnerable subjects as “suffering” trauma; rath-
er, I suggest that trauma studies and affect theory can supplement our broader analyses of  
state and sovereign violence through its prioritization of  affected and effected subjects rather 
than of  oppressors or architects of  violent practices. That being said, I also do not intend 
to suggest that affect theory and trauma studies should comprise the extent of  our attention 
to vulnerable subjects; the next move, which lies beyond the scope of  this paper, would be 
to amplify the mechanisms of  resistance and perseverance that subjects possess and are able to 
employ in spite of  inhabiting insecure spaces.5 The reorientation toward affect studies that 
follows, then, is only the first step in centering vulnerable subjects as subjects whose voices 
are essential for understanding the broader consequences of  arbitrary sovereign violence. 
II.  
ANXIOUS BODIES, TRAUMA, AND BEING-IN-THE-STATE OF EXCEPTION 
Architectural historian Anthony Vidler noted in 1993 that “the realms of  organic space of  the 
body, and the social space in which that body lives and works […] no longer can be identified 
as separate” (84), but recognized too that “a theory of  space, uncorrected by any dialecti-
cal relationship with history, has often hovered dangerously close to a metaphysics of  place” 
(85). Understood in a Marxist register, “history” is the situatedness of  beings, the contextual-
     4 Though there is arguably an existential dimension thereto, I distance myself  from use of  the term “ontological” 
insecurity here as my interest is not solely on categories of  “self-identity” or the “precarity” of  being, but also on 
the affective and phenomenological aspects of  such precarity on the individual and interpersonal level. However, 
I do share in many of  the foundational assumptions upon which ontological insecurity is grounded, such as the 
necessity of  trust and “belief  in the continuity, reliability, and consistency of  oneself, other people, and things” 
needed for ontological security (Hewitt 2010, 511). For more on ontological insecurity, I direct the reader to Gid-
dens (1991) and Young (2007).
     5 Isabell Lorey (2015) and Mariana Ortega (2016) are particularly insightful here.
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ized sociopolitical, cultural, and economic landscape in which beings come to be multifaceted 
subjects with overlapping identities. Taking up history in this distinctly materialist manner is 
not unfounded; Andrzej Zieleniec (2007) has emphasized the implicit role of  space in Marx’s 
historical materialism, as both a mode of  production and context of  consumption, and recog-
nized that, “whether space is more or less experienced and emphasized as a barrier or a limit 
to reciprocity reflects an understanding of  Marx’s view of  society as a set of  relationships that 
link individuals” (7). Alongside these Marxist understandings of  space as social and political 
arenas of  sociality, the philosophical writings of  Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
and Michel Foucault have, in recent decades, inspired critical phenomenologists to more deeply 
theorize about the relationship between body and space, recognizing a crucial existential dimen-
sion shaped by one’s relation to space that delineates one’s comfort in the world. 
     David Morris’ The Sense of  Space (2004) is a meditation precisely on this existential dimension, 
wherein he suggests that the fundamental situatedness of  human motility—that which allows 
for the emergence of  meaningful experience—is the “directed fit” that grounds all interactions 
between embodied consciousnesses and objects in the world:
. . . depth is constitutively differentiated as having a sense, a meaning for us, 
and it is we who make sense of  that meaning; sensing is not a passive activity, 
it is an active, transitive activity that depends upon sustaining a difference and 
sameness that crosses body and world. Body and world are thus sensed to one 
another, their relation is constituted such that the two appear as having a di-
rected fit, the sort of  fit belonging to a glove that fits on one hand, but not the 
other. (24) 
All perception, according to Morris, is thus a “matter of  moving in the world in a limited 
way”—contoured, in other words, by our unique understanding of  the spaces in which mean-
ing has become sedimented over time (109). It is for this reason that familiar movements of  
objects and people fade into the background of  our perceptual field—what Morris refers to 
as the “background unconcern” that is “sedimented with habitual meanings” (170)—and our 
attention is instead “grabbed by things that are ‘out of  place’” (113). 
     Beyond sensory experience, however, our sense of  space contains within it an affective or 
psychosocial dimension that bears on our feeling of comfort in the world; “[a]ffective depth,” as 
Lisa Guenther (2015) writes in her phenomenological critique of  solitary confinement, “marks 
the emergence and unfolding of  meaningful space, space that matters to what Heidegger would 
call my Being-in-the-world” (242). It is this affective element—in both its individual and inter-
subjective modalities—that I refer to as the “existential” dimension of  being-in-the-world and 
which serves as the ground of all of  our phenomenological experiences of  spatiality. And cru-
cially, once the unfamiliar enters our perceptual field or we are thrown into a spatial situation 
we have not previously encountered—once we experience a disruption of  familiar space, in other 
words—we experience not only a perceptual “shock” but an affective one as well. 
     Sara Ahmed has been a leading voice in contemporary affect theory, recognizing that geo-
political shifts—particularly in the increasingly multicultural West—challenge the longstand-
ing norms and narratives that shape the social imaginaries and constructed identities of  the 
“nation.” The response, Ahmed suggests, has been the reorientation of  “world-making” by 
dominant social groups (in the U.S., white social groups) to reassert a “politics of  truth” that 
recognizes and secures their privileged status. Crucial to this world-making is the use of  fear 
to manufacture identifiable objects of  threat from which subjects can “[reestablish] distance 
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between bodies” and make borders “by establishing objects from which the subject, in fear-
ing, can stand apart, objects which become ‘the not’ from which the subject appears to flee” 
(Ahmed 2003, 388, 389). This has paradigmatically been accomplished by designating certain 
subjects (brown, ethnically Arab, Afghani, or Pakistani, of  Muslim origin, etc.) “terrorists” that 
the sovereign, in the interest of  its white subjects, uses to reassert itself  as a beacon of  freedom, 
liberal progressivism, and democratic self-fashioning.
     Here the distinction between anxiety and fear is crucial, insofar as anxiety does not operate 
quite like the “affective political tool” of  Ahmed’s writings. For Ahmed (2014), fear “preserves 
only through announcing a threat to life itself,” an announcement that in turn produces ob-
jects—determinate threats, in other words—that the state can then address through exclusion, 
containment, or elimination (64). Fear, then, works to preserve a designated “us”—which, for 
Ahmed in the context of  the U.S., is the “white” world—and latches on to objects that (threat-
en to) “approach.” In this way, fear becomes identity-producing or -sustaining—creating “the 
very effect of  ‘that which I am not’” (67) in order to mobilize and protect the (white) “bodies” 
that fear—due largely to the paradigm of  security that has eclipsed (or perhaps, reoriented) the 
state’s aims in the post-Cold War age. Rather than inspire the production of  political collec-
tivities—as is its function in, for example, the Hobbesian social contract—the language of  fear 
now “involves the intensification of  threats, which works to  create a distinction between those 
who are ‘under threat’ and those who threaten” (72).
     Anxiety, on the other hand, is an approach to objects—rather than, as with fear, “produced by an 
object’s approach”—and manifests as the “detachment” from objects to which anxiety “sticks” 
(66). Anxiety is not unrelated to fear, but it does inspire in the anxious subject a unique relation 
to the world that fear does not, eroding the subject’s sense of  self  and motility in a world that 
has become unpredictable, unknowable, and unsafe. Insofar as objects of  fear can be eliminat-
ed, bypassed, or avoided, the looming threat characteristic of  anxiety is not exhausted even after 
concrete manifestations of  sovereign reprisals—either through deportation raids, drone strikes, 
or unpredictable police brutality—are carried out. In these instances, it is the unpredictability 
of  sovereign violence itself that sustains the feeling of  anxiety for bodies vulnerable thereto; to 
the extent that there is no identifiable object of  fear for those at risk of  experiencing arbitrary 
sovereign violence (a mirror of  the lack of  referent that for Schmitt necessitated the sovereign 
decision), there is no way for the vulnerable subject to flee or eliminate that which induces the 
anxiety and, consequently, anxiety comes to pervade all aspects of  the subject’s interactions in 
and with space. As Norma Rossi (2017) acutely observes, “anxiety is destined to remain below 
the surface once the crisis has passed, both in the form of  past traumatic memory and possible 
future return” (127). Unlike fear, then, anxiety thus does not serve to preserve secure spaces, but 
renders space perpetually insecure. 
     Rossi’s appeal to the language of  “trauma” here tellingly illuminates a key dimension of  
persistent anxiety which is mirrored in Judith Herman’s work on trauma. Herman (2015), 
professor emerita of  psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, observes that “[i]t is not necessary 
to use violence often to keep the victim in a constant state of  fear,” but fear is rather “increased 
by inconsistent and unpredictable outbursts of  violence” (77, emphasis added). Notably, Herman 
is here speaking of  trauma caused by captivity in particular—drawing on the Nazi concentra-
tion camp as an extreme manifestation thereof—but, if  the state of  exception is everywhere 
becoming the rule, this may be reasonably extended to our conceptualization of  the status of  
those living in spaces of  arbitrary violence. Assumpta Ekeh’s (2016) phenomenological analysis 
of  trauma is further helpful here, which posits that “[b]eing involved in an unforeseen trauma 
is being thrown into the world in a particular way” (174, emphasis added). Understood in the 
language of  “worlds,” trauma “presents a loss of  control over how reality is understood, severing 
the fundamental distinctions used by individuals to make sense of  their surroundings” (Furtado 
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2017, 40, emphasis added). In other words, the unpredictability of  the security of  one’s space 
of  inhabitance and the trauma generated thereby renders one’s very existential relation to the 
world insecure. 
     Building on this theme, theorists and social scientists alike recognize that trauma often ac-
companies fundamental changes in a subject’s relation to space and, as such, comfort in space, 
both with regard to material objects and other “embodied consciousnesses.” Drawing on the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Statistical 
Classification of  Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) by the World Health Organiza-
tion, Martin Endreß and Andrea Pabst (2013) outline five predominant symptoms of  trauma 
“which have implications for interpersonal relationships” (97). Of  the five, two include “alter-
ation of  spatial experience” and “alteration of  self-awareness and perception of  others” (97, 
98). In their account of  the phenomenology of  violence as a “negation of  sociality,” Endreß 
and Pabst emphasize the interconnectedness of  experiences of  trauma and the destabilization 
of  self  and world. 
     A prime example is the reporting of  Pakistani psychiatrists who have worked with survivors 
and civilians living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the most unremitting 
site where drone strikes have taken place under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of  Military 
Force (AUMF).6  The testimonies of  survivors and witnesses indicate psychological insecurities 
not dissimilar from the “phenomenological disorder” described by Guenther or the “alter-
ation” of  social situatedness described by Endreß and Pabst:
Interviewees described emotional breakdowns, running indoors or hiding 
when drones appear above, fainting, nightmares and other intrusive thoughts, 
hyper startled reactions to loud noises, outburst of  anger or irritability, and loss 
of  appetite and other physical symptoms. Interviewees also reported suffering 
from insomnia and other sleep disturbances, which medical health profession-
als in Pakistan stated were prevalent. (83)
As Endreß and Pabst note in their analysis of  social trust, “[t]he doubting of  one’s own percep-
tion combines with the finding that the social environment has lost its reliability . . . [and] ‘onto-
logical security’ is harmed or destroyed.” This, Endreß and Pabst suggest, is “accompanied by 
[not only] a loss of  trust in one’s own abilities, but the perception of  others, the perception of  
spaces, time, and situations is, at least, disrupted” (100). Quite simply, the ontological insecurity 
generated by the spatial disruption of  the drone zone, as we can see through these firsthand 
accounts, engender forms of  experience that are, as Serena Parekh (2013) says, rooted in “a 
separation from the common realm of  humanity” (646). Perhaps most troubling, however—
and that which is most acutely absent in theories of  the “exception”—is that the effects of  these 
existential disruptions will linger well beyond the eradication of  drone warfare or the subjects’ 
departure from spaces where drone strikes have taken place. When speaking of  drones’ impacts 
on children, a mental health professional in the FATA voices her concern that: 
. . . when the children grow up, the kinds of  images they will have with them, it is going 
to have a lot of  consequences . . . People who have experienced such things, they don’t 
    
      
     6 This is a theme I have explored in greater detail elsewhere; see Sabeen Ahmed (2018) for a more thorough 
analysis of  the phenomenology of  space in the “drone zone” than what is presented here.
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trust people; they have anger, desire for revenge . . . So when you have these young boys 
and girls growing up with these impressions, it causes permanent scarring and damage. 
(“Living Under Drones,” 87)
Although sites where drone warfare are particularly acute spaces of  arbitrary sovereign vio-
lence—arbitrary insofar as inhabitants have no way of  knowing whether they are targets nor of  
when strikes will actually take place—they are by no means the only ones. Indeed, what I turn 
to now are accounts of  U.S. citizens whose inhabitance in certain spaces—highly-concentrated 
immigrant communities, socioeconomically disadvantaged urban spaces, and, increasingly, the 
“intrusions” of  subjects of  color in white communities—render them particularly vulnerable 
to sovereign violence—incarceration, deportation, and execution—and induce a similar sense 
of  existential insecurity. 
     What is distinctive about these spaces of  exception, however, is that they are not spaces of  
exception for all subjects residing therein. This is a point beautifully expressed by Mariana Or-
tega, whose notion of  the “multiplicity” of  being attends to the varying degrees of  “ease” that 
are contingent upon one’s corporeal subjectivity and subsequent location in space and time. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Ortega (2016) characterizes the multiplicitous self  as “being-in-worlds 
and being-between-worlds, a singular self  occupying multiple social locations and a condition 
of  in-betweenness” with a “sense of  how she fares in worlds” on an existential register (64-65). 
It is precisely “being-in-worlds” that “constitutes an existential dimension of  this self,” insofar 
as “worlds are intertwined and stand in relation to powers with each other” rather than exist 
as static objects which organize subjects equally and homogeneously (65). This is largely why 
Ortega utilizes a phenomenological approach rather than an ontological one, to explain why it is that 
two subjects can exist in the same space without inhabiting the same “world.” The space of  
exception similarly renders an “exceptional world” for some and not others, and it is to testi-
monies of  those inhabiting these worlds that I now turn.
III.  
NARRATIVES OF EXISTENTIAL INSECURITY  
AND THE NECESSITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
As Lisa Guenther (2013) eloquently states in her work on solitary confinement, life itself  is “a 
struggle to maintain a meaningful, integrated, and open-ended relation to one’s environment 
as a whole, including the other living beings with whom one shares a common Umwelt” (119). 
But what can we say of  subjects who are prevented from developing a relation of  comfort to the 
world altogether, whose daily existence is one of  spatial—and thus, existential—insecurity, and 
whose experiences of  trauma “overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life” (Herman 
2015, 33)? 
     Fortunately, traumatization is increasingly acknowledged within philosophy and political 
theories as the realities of  psychological- and neuro-atypicalities are destigmatized and normal-
ized on the social scientific and medical levels. Concomitant to these shifts, however, has been a 
growing concern with “adverse childhood experiences” (ACEs) and their consequences on cog-
nitive and behavioral development—issues that have yet to be adequately attended to in phil-
osophical and political writings. As Judith Herman (2015) observes, “[e]arly life trauma affects 
the ‘emotional brain,’ the right brain, which develops rapidly in the first years of  life and whose 
functions form the basis of  human sociability” (257). However, given that more and more 
children are subject to different iterations of  sovereign violence, much of  which is arbitrary in 
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nature, I suggest we look beyond discrete traumatic events—paradigmatically childhood sexual 
assault or abuse—toward the lasting developmental and interpersonal effects of  persistent anxiety. 
It is for this reason that the cases I examine below focus on children, but in no way do I suggest 
that young adults or adults are not also vulnerable to similar psychosocial disorientations or de-
stabilizations. Rather, if  we understand the body as a “text” to the truth, then recognizing those 
most profoundly affected by arbitrary violence—children—may be particularly illuminating 
avenues for envisioning the futures of  today’s normalized spaces of  exception.
     Journalistic pieces and news articles paint the clearest pictures of  these phenomenological 
realities, principally by publishing testimonies from parents that highlight the psychosocial con-
sequences of children’s suffering of  arbitrary violence. Writing about a mother whose five-year 
-old son was shot during a Mother’s Day Cookout, Stephen Crockett Jr. (2014) characterizes 
the interviewee’s neighborhood in Richmond, Virginia as “infected”:
[C]hildren from urban neighborhoods live in continual violence and therefore 
suffer from all of  the symptoms that have been found in veterans once they 
return home from war. The big difference here is that the trauma is on a con-
tinuous loop because the violence is happening outside the front door. Even 
people who live with the trauma every day may underestimate its effect. 
Other articles documenting life in the inner-city United States—populated predominantly by 
socioeconomically disadvantaged people of  color—make similar analogies to veteran trauma, 
suggesting that there exists a widespread crisis of  “urban PTSD” generated by the constant 
threat of  violence; the crucial difference, of  course, is that the anxieties generated by one’s pre-
dominant world (rather than one that is singular and temporary, such as the battlefield) do not go 
away. As explained by Jen Christensen (2014) of  CNN, “[i]f  someone is exposed to prolonged, 
repetitive, or extreme trauma, the amygdala stays in alert mode. And the neuros, the pathways 
to this part of  the brain, lose their ability to recover.” And indeed, she adds, direct exposure 
to violence is unnecessary for subjects to develop this type of  PTSD: “When there is a percep-
tion that there is disorder in a particular neighborhood, it causes some residents to suffer from 
PTSD” (emphasis added).
     Though especially acute therein, these anxieties are not confined to urban spaces alone. 
Many Americans of  color—and especially black Americans—have written about their expe-
riences raising children to comport themselves in particular ways, avoiding gestures or behav-
iors—including playing with toy guns or wearing baggy clothing—that may indicate “criminal-
ity.” Journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones (2018), for example, recounts not calling the police after 
a shooting incident in Long Island (“before Michael Brown [and] [b]efore police killed John 
Crawford III for carrying a BB gun in a Walmart or shot down twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in 
a Cleveland Park”) because she “feared what could happen if  police came rushing into a group 
of  people who, by virtue of  our skin color, might be mistaken for suspects.” Jazmine Hughes 
(2014), writing during the early days of  the #BlackLivesMatter movement, remarks that this 
inability to trust in law enforcement “makes people afraid to have black babies, because they 
won’t stand a chance.” For her own part, Hughes states that, “[a]s a black woman, nothing will 
stop me from bearing and raising my future child, but nothing will stop me from raising them 
in fear.”
     Lisa Guenther has been a leading voice in illuminating the phenomenology of  incarcera-
tion—principally in terms of  solitary confinement—but we must remember that incarceration 
has harrowing psychosocial effects on the families and friends of  those incarcerated. In par-
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ticular, children with incarcerated parents experience their own share of  trauma, whether by 
bearing witness to a parent’s arrest, having to adapt to a way of  life void of  essential emotional 
and economic support structures, or removal to foster care. In her recent article on cognitive 
behavioral therapy with children of  incarcerated parents, Anna Morgan-Mullane (2018) ob-
serves that
[c]hildren can exhibit the emotional effects of  parental incarceration through 
complex trauma-related stress symptoms such as isolating themselves from 
their peers, anxiety, struggling to form healthy interpersonal relationships, 
concentration problems, sleep difficulties, emotional withdrawal from family 
members, substance use or dependence, and significant feelings of  shame and 
secrecy. If  unaddressed, the impacts of  these symptoms can often lead to long-
term psychological and emotional functioning problems. (200)
Speaking to the “worlds” of  these children, Morgan-Mullane adds that,  
[c]hildren of  incarcerated parents experience numerous sources of  material 
and emotional insecurity. For example, children of  incarcerated parents are 
more likely to receive public assistance, to experience interrupted phone or 
utility service due to non-payment, and to experience residential insecurity 
through missed mortgage and rental payments . . . [and] a parent’s incarcera-
tion can abruptly dismantle a family. (201)
Child separation is routinely addressed by trauma theorists as a profound source of  chronic trau-
ma, disruptive as it is of  the necessary and “normal” attachment relationships established in in-
fancy and which generate early feelings of  “trust” in one’s environment. Indeed, “[i]t has now 
become clear that the impact of  early relational disconnections is as profound as the impact 
of  trauma with a capital T” (Herman 2015, 263). Judith Herman and others call the effects 
of  such relational disconnections “disorganized attachment,” the primary causes of  which are 
neglect in childhood, either through parental absence or forced separation. 
     Unsurprisingly, then, the Trump administration’s infamous “zero tolerance” approach to 
detention and deportation has garnered scrutiny from those who recognize the lasting damage 
that “disorganized attachment” may precipitate. As testimonies reveal, the psychological after-
math of  child detention—where many children report having been subject to “neglect, assault 
and other horrific abuse” (Ellis, Hicken, and Ortega 2018)—persists long after children have 
been reunited with their parents. Harvard Medical School pediatrics professor Charles Nelson 
describes the effects of  parent-child separation as “catastrophic” for children, and petitions 
brought forth by the American Academy of  Pediatrics, the American College of  Physicians, 
the American Psychiatric Association, and “7,700 mental-health professionals and 142 orga-
nizations” warn of  the future consequences of  the “zero-tolerance” policy: “‘To pretend that 
separated children do not grow up with the shrapnel of  this traumatic experience embedded 
in their minds is to disregard everything we know about child development, the brain, and 
trauma’” (Wan 2018). There are, of  course, myriad firsthand accounts that corroborate these 
professional edicts. Olivia Caceres, who was separated from her one-year-old-son at a legal 
point of  entry in November of  2017, paints a harrowing and heartbreaking picture of  life with 
her child after eighty-five days of  separation: 
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(My son) is not the same since we were reunited. I thought that, because he is 
so young he would not be traumatized by this experience, but he does not sep-
arate from me. He cries when he does not see me. That behavior is not normal. 
In El Salvador he would stay with his dad or my sister and not cry. Now he cries 
for fear of  being alone.
. . .
[and] he continued to cry when we got home and would hold on to my leg and 
would not let me go. When I took off his clothes he was full of  dirt and lice. 
It seemed like they had not bathed him in the 85 days he was away from us. 
(Desjardins, Barajas, and Bush 2018)
Testimonies like Olivia’s are not unique in the Trump presidency, nor are they foreign to other 
minority groups’ experiences of  ontological insecurity in the United States, both before Trump 
and since. And for children of  undocumented immigrants who themselves are U.S. citizens, 
the possibility that one or both parents will be arrested has disrupted routine life. Speaking of  
her son Joseph, a U.S. citizen, Maria (last name not provided) tells reporter Hilary Andersson 
(2017) that he “is now afraid to go to school at all”: “‘I tell him: “It’s OK love, you go to that 
bus,”’ said Maria. ‘But he’s told me I’m scared I’m going to come back and you’re not going to 
be in the house.’” 
     Even prior to these more recent and extreme policy measures, the phenomenon of  being a 
targeted, undocumented, or minority resident has brought with it a lasting existential burden:
With nearly 11 million undocumented immigrants nationwide and 17.6 mil-
lion people with at least one undocumented relative, large communities are 
now experiencing anxiety about separation from their families. Some are hav-
ing flashbacks to the violence they experienced in their home countries. Some 
are retreating into the shadows, afraid to drive, bring their children to school, 
or even seek medical care. (Rinaldi 2017)
A recent article by Widian Nicola, in which she offers a distinctly phenomenological analysis 
of  her upbringing as part of  an “illegal” Catholic-Palestinian immigrant family in the United 
States, troubles some of  the stereotypes of  “illegal immigranthood” by charting the difficult 
and often-unsuccessful attempts of  such persons to obtain “legal” residency. When they first 
arrived in 1990, she writes, her parents “spent countless dollars on attorneys who offered false 
hope and stole their money only to leave our family wondering if  we would have the chance to 
stop living under the shadows and fear of  deportation” (Nicola 2017, 293). As she grew older, 
Nicola states that the very term “immigration” 
. . . intimidated me, filled me with doom, and made me anxious. I lived with 
this pervasive fear of  deportation and equated “immigration” with a “mon-
ster” that might come to get our family, and worse yet, hurt us . . . This uncer-
tainty and lack of  permanency continues to impact life to this day. (294)
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Although Nicola was eventually granted DACA status, the threat of  deportation ostensibly 
lifted, and her status as an “illegal immigrant” eliminated, “its ghost still haunted” her, making 
itself  felt in her very corporeal being: 
I knew cognitively that I was okay, but my body had still not caught up to the 
present reality of  my now legal status . . . As a child without the capacity to 
recognize, hold, and deal with my fears, I frequently disconnected from my 
body, mainly through eating. I did not have access, or, did not know I had ac-
cess to, somatic resources to ground me in the awareness of  my being, let alone 
my body . . . My distorted, yet very real embodied experience, meant that the 
terror and anger I felt would continue to grow over the years. The anger man-
ifested itself  in a great deal of  confusion about my identity and free will. (297)
For Nicola and others who have experienced or continue to experience unstable senses of  
spatial “at-home-ness,” the psychological and social consequences of  this perpetually insecure 
manner of  being lingers well beyond any “correction” of  ontological status. 
     By refocusing our attention on the existential consequences of  inhabiting spaces of  arbi-
trary violence, we find that theories of  the exception fail to do justice to the realities of  life in 
spaces where the exception has become the norm for many (raced) subjects. Even in literature 
on the traditionally theorized “spaces” of  exception—the camp—there is little written on the 
phenomenological impact of  camp inhabitance on the existential constitution of  the subject; 
camp inhabitants are ontologized as homines sacri that are, for all intents and purposes, spatial-
ly-situated and contextually-bound. But what happens once the state of  exception is eradicat-
ed, when the refugee camp is dismantled or liberated? For some, especially those who were 
born and raised in refugee camps, life outside of  the camps is unimaginable. Asad Hussein 
(2016), budding journalist who was born in the Dadaab Refugee Complex in Kenya in 1996, 
wrote twenty years later that, “I belong to a generation of  children who have been rendered 
stateless. I neither belong to Kenya, where I was born, nor Somalia, where my history begins. 
Sometimes, I say I am a child of  UNHCR.” Asad’s testimony was a response to Kenya’s most 
recent threat to demolish Dadaab, which has been the world’s largest refugee camp since its 
establishment in 1991. Despite its “exceptional” status, the threatened existential disruption of  
Dadaab’s eradication looms heavily for Asad and other camp residents. 
     Those who have more recently been rendered “stateless”—paradigmatically as a result of  
the Syrian catastrophe—have experienced devastating psychological effects of  escaping har-
rowing conditions and losing the crucial interpersonal and existential capacity of  self-determi-
nation in the face of  European asylum practices:
The German Federal Chamber of  Psychotherapists announced last year that 
more than 70 percent of  refugees who reached Germany have witnessed vi-
olence; around 50 percent have experienced violence themselves. That figure 
holds for 40 percent of  children; around a quarter saw violence against mem-
bers of  their family. As far back as 2013, UNHCR found that more than a fifth 
of  Syrians in a refugee camp in Jordan experienced anxiety disorders, with 8.5 
percent suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The German study found 
demand for psychotherapy among refugees just in Germany could be 20 times 
what is being delivered. (Herman 2016)
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Given the inadequacy of  refugee camps’—and some host countries’—infrastructure and re-
sources, the very living conditions of  these “states of  exception” leave researchers and theorists 
questioning what the future lives of  their inhabitants could look like. According to Patricia 
Mouamar (2015), writing from Lebanon,
More than two-thirds of  school-age refugees in Lebanon are being denied an ed-
ucation, either because they cannot afford the expenses or because they are forced 
to work to help support their families. In some areas, there are simply no schools 
available, or a lack of  transport prevents children from attending classes. For these 
children, the future citizens and leaders of  Syria, it’s hard to maintain hope . . . .    
The truth, no matter how you view it, is that a whole generation of  children is 
growing up displaced and educated. This will have real, long-term impacts, not 
just for them but for the future of  their country.
These myriad accounts, distinct (and importantly so) as they are, demonstrate a shared feeling 
of  perpetual unease, insecurity, and, fundamentally, anxiety. By drawing on these narratives, I 
have aimed to suggest that the effects of  such spatially unstable living are profound in scope, and 
necessitate not merely ontological classification or structural accounts, but an understanding of  
the experiences of  vulnerable subjects, articulated in their own words, in order to be captured fully. 
IV.  
EXISTENTIAL INSECURITY AS MODERN POLITICAL SUBJECTHOOD 
In a recent article for the New Yorker, Hua Hsu (2019) meditates on the “affective turn” in so-
cial and political theory, motivated in no small part by the “increasingly precarious times” and 
“sense of  dawning futility” borne of  a shifting global order propelled by 9/11. Hsu is here 
speaking to the general atmosphere in the United States of  the Trump era, but we can imagine 
extending the sentiment beyond U.S. borders amid rising global populism, political polariza-
tion, the resurgence of  extremism and fundamentalist views, and what seems to be a break-
down in the traditional narratives that allowed so many—including (and perhaps especially) 
the socially dominant—to make sense of  their history, their identity, their existential security. If  
the era of  the nation-state is approaching its end—as journalists and theorists alike increasing-
ly hypothesize—we are witnessing the erosion not only of  geopolitical boundaries, but of  the 
economic, political, and cultural hegemonies that have constituted the existential stability of  a 
certain spatial ordering of  global society. This looming spatial disruption has kindled existen-
tial terror within privileged groups as well as oppressed populations, fueling ethno-nationalist 
populist movements and social justice movements alike. Beyond even the scholarly writings of  
affect theorists and political philosophers, it is telling that journalists and public figures increas-
ingly characterize modernity as a “new age of  anxiety” (Hsu 2019). 
     Taking a phenomenological approach is, of  course, not the only way in which to engage 
critically with the social and political crises of  our present day. It does, however, allow us to 
highlight the lived experiences of  persons living in existential insecurity, so that we might better 
interrogate and do justice to the realities of  these crises. As Widian Nicola (2017) suggests, phe-
nomenological analysis offers a valuable parry against current social and political discourses 
concerning vulnerable subjects—whether undocumented immigrants, targets of  drone strikes 
and other indiscriminate military strategies, refugees, socioeconomically disadvantaged per-
sons, or those oppressed on the basis of  other identity categories—that are “structured around 
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a need to quantify the worth and value and/or threat of  one group versus another,” and which 
in turn “lead to conservations that attempt to defend the worthiness and credibility of  the 
[subject] to stay or go, instead of  attending to the underlying phenomenon at play” (294). At 
its core, phenomenology helps us move past concepts such as “bare life,” “exception,” and 
even “law” itself, to more effectively “lay bare” how the consequences of  these ideas extend 
well beyond their abstract contours. From the amplification of  deportations to extreme vetting, 
hyper-policing to technological surveillance, and degrees of  political, ethnic, and religious fac-
tionalism not seen since the era of  the World Wars, it is perhaps time to focus our attention 
on the phenomenological and existential crises of  our current world if  we hope for, and strive 
toward, a better future. 
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